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Introduction
Growing theoretical interest in the microfoundations of political processes, coupled with
increased data availability and technological advances, have led to tremendous progress in
collection and availability of disaggregated data, such as data on subnational units (e.g.
protest campaigns, insurgents, terrorist groups, interest groups, political parties or move-
ments). While creating opportunities for answering new types of research questions, these
new types of data also introduce new theoretical and statistical challenges. One of the biggest
challenges, and the focus of this paper, is recognizing and modeling the non-randomness of
the structural processes that result in such data availability—an issue we refer to as structural
selection.
Subnational political outcomes, such as protests, insurgencies, and domestic terrorist
attacks, usually result from a two-stage non-random process. In the first stage, a group of
individuals makes a decision to work together in pursuit of a common goal. In the second
stage, the group makes decisions related to the promotion of their goal. The two outcomes—
group formation and group activity—are interrelated, but each stage takes place at a different
level of aggregation. In the first stage of this process, specific structural conditions, e.g. state-
level factors such as a lack of government accountability or economic inequality, may lead
to the formation of an insurgency group in a country. In the second stage, a set of group-
level factors, such as group cohesion, values and ideology, and access to resources, affect
this group’s actions in pursuit of their goal. Deriving theoretical and statistical inferences
regarding either of the outcomes, therefore, necessitates a two-level theoretical and statistical
approach to modeling this interdependence.
Whether the outcome of interest is the formation or the activity of a subnational actor,
deriving unbiased theoretical and statistical inferences of one requires an understanding of
the other. Exclusion from economic resources may increase the probability of a formation
of an insurgent group, yet at the group level, a lack of access to economic resources may
limit the group’s ability to engage in attacks. In this example, a group’s exclusion from
economic resources has two competing effects: a positive effect on the probability of an
insurgency group formation and a negative effect on the probability or frequency of attacks.
Simply controlling for horizontal inequality in statistical analysis, as is the current practice
in the empirical literature, will obscure the effects of this variable and may lead to incorrect
inferences regarding the outcome at the second stage—group activity. Since expectation of
group’s success is likely an important consideration for group formation, inferences regarding
groups formation—the first stage—without an understanding of the group’s probability of
success, will also be biased. As a special case of the sample-selection problem, the issue of
structural selection constitutes a relatively new and growing challenge for theoretical and
statistical inferences.
Rather than constituting a random sample, units of observation in disaggregated datasets
are observed (and enter the data) as a result of non-random national or systemic processes—
what we refer to as structural selection processes. When not explicitly modeled, structural
selection will result in the same type of bias as the infamous unit self-selection. A failure
to recognize and model structural selection may result in a trivial conclusion that the very
existence of insurgent or terrorist groups in a country is the best predictor of these groups’
attacks, victory, or other activities of interest. Analyzing rebel groups’ activity without
a regard to the non-random structural conditions that led to their occurrence in the first
place—the prevalent empirical practice—is akin to studying the effect of unpaid internships
on starting salary. While the conditional treatment effect may reveal a positive relationships
between taking one of more unpaid internships and starting salary, a failure to model the
structural factors that allow some applicants to take unpaid internships in the first place (e.g.,
proximity to urban areas, family income and connections) may exaggerate the inferences from
such a study.
Likewise, analyzing the effect of counter-insurgency policies (e.g., limitation on the free-
dom of movement) on a subsample of countries that experienced an insurgency will not help
estimate the effect of similar policies in cases that have latent (but not active) insurgent
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groups. In other words, a counter-insurgency policy that is shown to fail at containing an
ongoing insurgency, for example, may be very effective at preventing an onset of an insur-
gency. Testing counter-insurgency theories and policies only on a subsample of cases that
have experienced an insurgency will obscure this very important insight.
The goal of the paper is, first, to draw attention to this important source of bias in studies
that use subnational or other types of disaggregated data—a quickly growing area of research
and data collection. Second, we propose an elegant and easy-to-implement statistical solution
by highlighting the link between structural selection and multi-level modeling. The key to
our approach is to specify a two-stage model by including the structural determinants of
selecting into the sample as part of the first stage (i.e., the selection equation), and the
group-level determinants of the outcome of interest (e.g., protests, attacks) as part of the
second stage. As a result, the selection equation, possibly estimated at a higher level of
aggregation, helps correct for the non-randomness of the sample that is used to estimate the
outcome of interest. We show that our approach applies well to outcome variables drawn
from common social-data distributions, including binary and count variables.
In the next section, we review the common types of sample selection bias, with a focus
on structural selection. We then show how the specific type of sample selection of interest is
easily corrected if the problem is recast in terms of a multi-level data structure. We discuss
our approach in the context of other existing statistical techniques and highlight the advan-
tages and scope of our approach. We support our argument with a Monte Carlo experiment
and three empirical applications. First, we replicate Chenoweth and Stephan’s (2011) study
of the relationship between non-violent protest campaigns and successful outcomes. Second,
we re-analyze Asal and Rethemeyer’s (2008) study of the lethality of terror attacks. Third,
we re-examine Wood’s (2010) study on the relationship between civilian targeting and rebel
group strength. We find that several of the inferences and conclusions drawn from these
studies are determined, in part, by the underlying structural selection processes that make
disaggregated events data observable.
3
Sample Selection Bias in Observational Data
Social scientists have long been aware of possible sample selection biases associated with
observational data (Heckman 1979; Geddes 1990; Hug 2003; Nieman 2015). In contrast to
data collected in experimental setting, observational data often yield non-random or biased
samples. Uncorrected, sample selection bias leads to biased estimates in regression analysis.
Using Heckman’s (1979) original example, a sample of women in the workforce produces
biased estimates of wages of women who chose to never enter the workforce, even control-
ling for levels of education and other relevant variables. Analogously, studies of political
participation have long acknowledged that a sample of registered voters provides a poor es-
timate of turnout for unregistered voters (Erikson 1981; Squire, Wolfinger and Glass 1987;
Barreto, Segura and Woods 2004; Nickerson 2014). Other subfields of political science have
also recognized the issue: international conflict research has shown that a sample of cases
of failed deterrence are not indicative of the probability of deterrence success for cases, in
which the credibility of deterrence is never tested (Achen and Snidal 1989; Fearon 2002).
Likewise, research on international organization has demonstrated that compliance rates of
countries that enter international treaties is not indicative of those that do not (Von Stein
2005; Lupu 2013; Chyzh 2014).
In each of these examples, the bias is a result of the correlation between the outcome
of interest and unit “self-selection” into the data. Collecting an unbiased (random) sample
of all potential voters (rather than just registered voters) is impeded by the absence of
definitive lists of unregistered voters (Barreto, Segura and Woods 2004), just like drawing a
random sample of deterrence cases requires identifying the unobservable cases of successful
deterrence. In both cases, the units’ probability of appearing in the sample is correlated
with the outcome variable, and, even more problematically, with the probability of being
observed in the first place.
Despite significant progress within certain areas of study, many types of selection remain
undetected, continuing to obfuscate processes of interest. Part of the problem is that selection
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bias does not have a single cause, but may stem from a number of different processes related
to the data-generating processes, case observability, data collection, and decisions made by
the researcher. Hug (2003) identifies three general sources of selection bias. The first type—
selection on the dependent variable when the whole population is observable—has so far
received the most scholarly attention (Geddes 1990; King, Keohane and Verba 1994; Dion
1998). This type of bias is easily remedied by drawing cases from the entire observable
population rather than only those in which the dependent variable takes on the value of
interest. This source of selection bias is perhaps the best understood and accounted for in
today’s literature.
The second type of selection bias may occur when cases self-sort themselves into specific
outcomes, as in Heckman’s canonical example where women choose to enter the workforce or
stay at home. Just like women’s decision to enter the workforce may be partially determined
by their expected income, a country’s joining of a treaty may not be independent of its
subsequent compliance. In this case, correcting for possible selection bias involves specifying
the two outcomes as separate equations and estimating them as part of a two-stage model,
e.g. a Heckman selection model. In current research, discussions of this type of bias and
the implementation of appropriate corrections are rather commonplace (e.g., Reed 2000;
Signorino and Tarar 2006; Hansen, Rocca and Ortiz 2015; Chyzh 2016; Feezell 2016; Nieman
2016).
The third type of selection bias—the focus of this paper—arises when case selection is
perfectly correlated with case observability. This type of selection bias is most common
in disaggregated datasets, whose cases are nested within a non-random sample of larger
administrative units, e.g. insurgent groups or protesters within countries. Cases in these
types of data are observed and enter the data as a result of a two-stage process. In the first
stage, a subset of population decides whether to form an organization to pursue a collective
goal, such as a political party, an insurgent group, or a terrorist organization. Even if such a
group forms, this outcome may not be observable, as such subnational organizations are often
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informal or operate underground. A large number of such groups are only recorded as cases
in scholarly data on the basis of a second-stage decision of whether they take specific actions
towards the promotion of their goal, such as run in an election, challenge the government,
or engage in an attack. As a further complication, the two decisions—to form and to take
action to promote their goal—are not independent of each other. The group’s expected
success is likely a consideration for its formation in the first place (Nieman 2015).
Identifying the negative cases, such as the parties that never formed, or the insurgent
groups that never organized, constitutes a tremendous conceptual challenge for collecting
these types of data (Mahoney and Goertz 2004). Despite much effort correct for the sampling
bias, such as the Minorities at Risk (MAR) Project (Minorities at Risk Project 2009) or the
AMAR (A for “all”) project whose goal is to collect the selection bias of the MAR data
(Birnir et al. 2018), the resulting datasets are bound to suffer from various degrees of sample
selection bias.
A key analytical complication for modeling structural selection is that the two outcomes—
group formation and group activity—are produced by factors at different levels of aggregation
or analysis. While a subnational group’s decision to organize is usually driven by national
or regional factors (e.g., dissatisfaction with government), the group’s activity is a function
of group-level factors (e.g., group’s resources, ideology). Sample selection bias is introduced
into the model as a result of the broader structural factors that lead to the formation of
subnational groups. Correcting for such structural bias, therefore, necessitates a multi-level
framework that bridges the group- and structure-levels of analysis.
Modeling Structural Selection Effects
Traditional selection estimators (e.g., Heckman 1979; Signorino 2003) are designed to model
selection processes, in which both selection and outcome take place at the same unit of
analysis.1 Correcting the inferences regarding the wages of women in the workforce, for
1Some recent scholarship has proposed applying matching techniques to address endogeneity. Matching
techniques, of course, can only match cases on observables and necessarily assume that data selection does
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instance, is accomplished by modeling the outcome as the second stage of a process whose
first stage comprised women deciding whether to enter the workforce. Importantly, the
sample selection process is uncorrelated with the level of data aggregation: women exist in
all countries independent of their decision to enter the workforce. Correcting for this type of
sample selection, therefore, simply requires collecting additional data on women that chose
not to enter the workforce and modeling this decision as the first stage of the analysis.
In contrast, structural sample selection implies not just a multi-stage, but also a multi-
level, selection process—observed cases select into the second stage and level. Terrorist
groups, for example, are not equally likely to form in all countries: the probability of observ-
ing a terrorist group is correlated with this group’s probability of eliciting concessions from
the government. While the group-level outcome (e.g., terrorist attacks) is mostly a function
of group-level factors (e.g., resources, goals, member preferences), the group’s existence is
a function of structural factors (e.g., economic inequality, government capacity).2 While
the traditional approach would dictate that the selection bias be alleviated via collecting
additional data on groups that never formed, such a task may not be productive or even
practical. Instead, we propose an alternative, more elegant approach to modeling struc-
tural selection by re-conceptualizing the process of sample selection from the perspective of
multi-level modeling.
The two stages of the process take place at different levels of aggregation, i.e. the first
stage takes place at a higher/lower level of aggregation than the second stage. For example,
subnational political actors, such as political parties, protesters, insurgents, and terrorist
groups, are nested within their host-states. These groups form and act within the incentives
and constraints of their host state (e.g., GDP per capita, political institutions). These groups’
activity—running in an election, challenging the government, or engaging in attacks—is also
not depend on potential outcomes (Ho et al. 2007). Chaudoin, Hays and Hicks (2018) demonstrate that if
data suffer from selection on unobservables—as in the cases of structural selection we describe—matching
techniques can exacerbate bias and overconfidence in estimates, as well as increase the number of falsely
positive, statistically significant results.
2The stages of the process are, of course, rarely completely contained within levels, e.g., along with
group-level factors, terrorist activity may be affected by some structural factors.
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determined by the group-level factors, such as groups’ resources and ideology.
More formally, denote a group-level outcome (e.g., number of attacks) as Y, and model
this outcome as a function of exogenous group-level regressors, X, and a group-level distur-
bance term ǫ, i.e.:
Y = βX+ ǫ, (1)
where β is a vector of model parameters.
According to the structural selection process, the group-level outcome Y is observed (i.e.,
takes on non-missing values) under specific structural conditions, i.e. X and ǫ are observed
if condition α is met. More formally:
Y = α(βX+ ǫ) (2)
where α is an indicator variable of whether the specific condition is met and is itself a
function of structural factors. That is:
α∗ = γZ+ η (3)
so that
αi =


1 if α∗i > 0
0 if α∗i ≤ 0
where α∗ is a vector of the latent condition, α∗i is an element of that vector, αi is an element
of a vector containing the latent condition’s observed realization, γ is a vector of parameters,
Z is a matrix of exogenous structure-level covariates, and η is a vector of error terms at the
structural level.
Importantly, Equation 3 must be estimated on a random sample drawn from the entire
population of relevant units, not just the units, for which the group-level outcome and
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covariates are observed. In a study of domestic terrorist attacks, for example, Equation 3
would include all countries—not just the countries with known domestic terrorist groups—
and model the outcome variable of whether a terrorist group formed within a country, αi,
as a function of the exogenous covariates, Z.3 And the second-stage equation—Equation 2—
would be specified with covariates that affect the number of attacks, Y, as a function of
covariates X (e.g. group size, resources, ideology).
If ǫ and η are correlated, i.e. corr(ǫ,η) 6= 0, then the data availability on the group-level
variables X, as well as the values of X, depend in part on the structural covariates Z. This,
in turn, means that the structural covariates Z affect the outcome Y, albeit not necessarily
in a linear form. Non-zero correlation between ǫ and η is likely, as this simply means
that unobserved factors are correlated across the structure- and group-level. Conceptually
related variables measured at the two different levels of aggregation, such as a state’s military
capacity and an insurgent’s strength relative to the government, are likely to suffer from a
some degree of measurement error which is correlated across levels. Moreover, unobservable
covariates, like the degree of group and government resolve, are likely to be correlated across
the two stages/equations. Non-zero correlation that is due to either measurement error
or unobservable variables across the relevant levels of analysis produces selection bias in
estimates of model parameters.
The proposed framework works for random variables measured on a continuous scale, as
well as random variables that follow other normal or exponential family distributions (e.g.,
probit, logistic, poisson). Equations 2–3 may be re-written for a continuous random variable
as:
Yi =


βXi + ǫi if αi = 1
missing if αi = 0.
3In this example, Z may include such covariates as government’s responsiveness, GDP, geographical size
and topography, or ethnic fractionalization.
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For binary outcome variables, this takes on the form:
Yi =


1 if Y∗i > βXi + ǫi + and αi = 1
0 if Y∗i ≤ βXi + ǫi and αi = 1
missing if αi = 0.
The binary outcome variable case, of course, also extends to other discrete outcomes, such
as ordered or nominal outcomes (see Miranda and Rabe-Hesketh 2006).
Finally, the count outcome variables differ slightly as the outcome can theoretically take
on a number of discrete values (Miranda and Rabe-Hesketh 2006, 291-292). If we assume
that a count random variable Y follows a Poisson distribution, so that Pr(Y|µ) = µ
Ye−µ
Y!
,
then we can specify a log-linear model for the mean, µ. We can then write the count model
as:
ln(µi) =


βXi + ǫi if αi = 1
missing if αi = 0.
Notably, in the case of count models, the amount of overdispersion in the count is a function of
the variance of ǫ and can be identified and estimated (Miranda and Rabe-Hesketh 2006, 291).
In other words, despite the assumption that the count ofY follows a Poisson distribution, the
variance given a set of covariates is not equal to the conditional mean but instead permits and
recovers estimates for the degree of overdispersion (see Kenkel and Terza 2001; Winkelmann
2008).
An advantage of focusing on the multi-level nature of the data—the group- (g) and
structural-levels (s)—is that it provides a theoretical framework and justification to adopt
a system estimator for the selection process. If the outcomes of interest are measured
on a discrete scale—e.g. binary or count—they must be estimated with full information
maximum likelihood (FIML), rather than a two-step estimation approach (Miranda 2004;
Miranda and Rabe-Hesketh 2006; Freedman and Sekhon 2010; Greene 2010, 2018). Recov-
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ering unbiased estimates using a two-step approach, i.e. using the inverse Mills ratio—the
ratio of the probability density function and the cumulative density function from the selec-
tion equation—as a regressor in the outcome equation, is predicated on two key assumptions:
(1) a bivariate normal distribution of the error terms in the selection and outcome equations
and (2) that the inverse Mill’s ratio has a linear effect in the outcome equation. If either as-
sumption is not met, inclusion of the inverse Mill’s ratio leads to model misspecification and
may induce bias (Winship and Mare 1992; Freedman and Sekhon 2010; Greene 2010, 2018).
The second assumption, of course, is not met if the outcomes of interest for the group-level
equation are discrete data.
An additional advantage of the structural selection approach, in contrast to typical selec-
tion models which use data on the same level of analysis, is that it lends itself to more easily
overcoming concerns related to the exclusion restriction—that at least one exogenous vari-
able is not in both equations, a problem common to Heckman-type selection models (Sartori
2003; Winship and Mare 1992).4 This advantage stems from the different aggregation levels
in the data for the structural and group-level equations—or g 6= s—which makes the ability
to find an excluded variable much more straightforward. Most structural variables need not
be included in the group-level equation, as they only affect the group-level outcome indirectly,
by affecting the probability of the case realization (e.g., group formation) in the first-stage
equation. The model, of course, does not prohibit including the relevant structural variables
in both equations, as long as the restriction condition is met.
In summary, the proposed approach allows for modeling outcomes using disaggregated
data—data that are only observed and collected under certain structural conditions. The
scope conditions will apply to studies using subnational data (e.g., data on insurgencies,
protests) or other types of disaggregated data (e.g., political candidates for various levels
of administrative units, gangs operating in US states). If the outcome of interest, however,
4Alternatives to the exclusion restriction, such as identifying the model through function form (e.g.
Sartori 2003), require making assumptions and inducing specific types of model dependence that may vary
in appropriateness across studies.
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can occur under multiple conditions, and it is only effect sizes that vary, then the data do
not suffer from structural selection. Thus, a study of the effect of civil war on coups d’e´tat
would likely not suffer from structural selection, as coups can occur outside of a civil war
context. That is, civil wars are not a necessary condition for a coup d’e´tat; rather, coups
during a civil war are a subset of the broader coups d’e´tat category. In contrast, structural
selection would likely be present in a study of temporal dependence in violent coups, as the
type of coup (e.g., violent or peaceful) is conditional on observing a coup in the first place.
Monte Carlo Analysis
As an initial proof of our approach, we provide a Monte Carlo example. We start by gener-
ating S = 100 units at the structure level, each characterized by structure-level exogenous
covariates (Z) and random disturbance term (η). Covariates Z are drawn from a uniform
disribution, U [−2, 2], while η follows a normal distribution. Next, for each of the 100
structure-level units, we generate a random variable, α∗, such that:
α∗ = 0.5 + 1Z+ η (4)
For each structure-level unit s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , S}, such that α∗ > 0, we generate G=50
groups observations per structure-level unit to represent group-level sub-units typical to
disaggragated data (e.g., 50 terrorist groups or 50 group-month observations of the same
terrorist group). Each of the sub-units g ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,G} is characterized by fixed covariates
X (e.g., group size, resources, ideology), drawn from a uniform distribution, U [−2, 2]. The
group-level random variable, Y, is generated using a latent variable Y∗, such that:
Y∗ = α (−0.5 + 1X+ ǫ) . (5)
To induce error correlation between the structural and group-level outcomes, ǫ and η are
drawn from a multivariate normal distribution with mean 0, variance 1, and variance correla-
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tion of corr (ǫ, η) = ρ. The group-level random variable Y takes on the value of 1 if Y∗ > 0
and 0 otherwise. We vary the correlation between errors by setting ρ ∈ {0.7, 0.4,−0.4,−0.7}
and running 100 simulations at each value.
To compare the proposed approach with its alternatives, we estimate five different model
specifications on the generated data. First, to mimic the most common treatments of group-
level outcomes within the literature, we estimate (1) a probit model with just the group-level
variables (Model 1 specified in Equation 6), and (2) a probit model that includes both the
structure-level and the group-level variables in the same equation (Model 2 specified in
Equation 7). These models are estimated on all cases where α = 1 (i.e., a group-level
outcome is observed) but, of course, exclude the cases for which αi = 0 (i.e., a group-level
outcome is not observed due to structural “selection out”). We denote the structure-level
variables, which are only measured if αi = 1, as Z
∗. Model 2—a standard approach within
the literature—will, of course, provide conditional estimates of the effect of structural factors,
such as an estimate of the effect of government’s capacity on insurgents’ success, given that
the government failed to deter an insurgency in the first place.
Y∗i = β0 + β1Xi + ǫi, (6)
Y∗i = β0 + β1Xi + β2Z
∗
i + ǫi (7)
Next, we estimate two random-effects models, which allow the intercept to vary. This is a
commonly used estimation technique designed to capture unobservable structure-level effects
via a random intercept for each structural unit. The traditional random-effects model differs
from our approach, of course, in that it excludes those structural units for which there are no
group-level data, so the random intercepts, β0s, are estimated only for the groups observed
at the structural level. To indicate that the structural group intercepts are estimated using
censored data on structural covariates (i.e. where α = 1), we denote these estimates as β∗0s.
In the first of these random effects model (Model 3), we include just the group-level covariate
(see Equation 8), while in the second random-effects model (Model 4) we include both the
13
group- and the structure-level covariates (Equation 9).
Y∗i = β
∗
0s + β1Xi + ǫi, (8)
Y∗i = β
∗
0s + β1Xi + β2Z
∗
i + ǫi (9)
Finally, as Model 5, we estimate a model that corresponds to our proposed approach—
a Heckman probit such that the structure-level random variable is in the outcome of the
selection equation and the group-level random variable is the outcome of the second equation.
We expect that cases where group-level data are observed are not random but instead occur
in the presence of specific structural conditions. Unobserved but related structure-level
factors are also likely to be correlated with unobserved group-level characteristics. Thus,
structure-level variables can be treated as a selection stage to the group-level observations.
Y∗i = β0 + β1Xi + ǫi if α = 1 where α = 1 if α
∗ > 0, and 0 otherwise, (10)
α∗s = γ0 + γ1Zs + ηs (11)
We present the results of the Monte Carlo analysis in Figure 1 and Table 1.5 As our
estimates suggest, each of the probit models exaggerates the effect of X as ρ moves away
from zero. Moreover, the probit models asserts a high degree of certainty in their biased
estimates. Estimates of the structure-level variable in probit models that include Z have
the wrong sign on the parameter when ρ is positive and are biased towards zero when ρ is
negative. Finally, the probit models overestimate the effect of the constant when ρ is positive
and underestimate the effect (with the wrong sign) of the constant when ρ is negative. Bias
on the constant is problematic given that estimators of discrete data generating processes
are hyper-conditional—the estimated coefficient on one variable depends on the value of the
estimates of other variables. Thus, the substantive effects of a quantity of interest, as well
as the predictive power of the model, will be incorrect owing to bias in the constant.
5The coefficients reported on the constant in the RMSE tables are of the outcome equation for the
Heckman probit specification.
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Figure 1: Monte Carlos with Varying Degrees of Error Correlation Between Levels.
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Note: Vertical line represents the true value of the coefficient. Results for 100 simulations of 100
structure-level units, with 50 group-level observations per unit, for each value of rho.
Next, we examine parameter estimates from the probit models with random effects. Like
the initial probit models, random-effects probit models exaggerate the effect of X more the
farther ρ is from zero; in fact, exaggeration of the effect of X is much more pronounced here
than in the traditional probit models. Random-effects probit also performs poorly when a
structure-level variable is included, recovering estimates with the incorrect sign when ρ is
positive and estimates that are biased towards zero when ρ is negative. The model also
overestimates the constant when ρ is positive and underestimates the constant when ρ is
negative. In sum, these results suggest that the estimates of random-effects probit actually
exhibit the greatest degree of bias when compared to other models, which is especially
problematic given how often this approach is used to address structure-level heterogeneity
in structured data.
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Table 1: Root MSE with Varying Degrees of Error Correlation Between Levels.
Rho = −0.7 Rho = −0.4
Probit RE Heckman Probit RE Heckman
Var. Probit w/ Struct. RE Struct. Probit Var. Probit w/ Struct. RE Struct. Probit
X 0.259 0.284 0.475 0.474 0.273 X 0.201 0.205 0.226 0.225 0.209
Z — 0.591 — 0.494 0.470 Z — 0.788 — 0.777 0.462
Con. 0.494 0.938 0.497 1.056 0.375 Con. 0.331 0.545 0.324 0.566 0.313
Rho = 0.4 Rho = 0.7
Probit RE Heckman Probit RE Heckman
Var. Probit w/ Struct. RE Struct. Probit Var. Probit w/ Struct. RE Struct. Probit
X 0.208 0.212 0.234 0.234 0.220 X 0.266 0.294 0.463 0.463 0.285
Z — 1.256 — 1.268 0.456 Z — 1.498 — 1.580 0.439
Con. 0.355 0.592 0.396 0.651 0.350 Con. 0.574 1.101 0.817 1.401 0.429
Finally, we turn to the probit model that accounts for potential structural selection
effects. Figure 1 and Table 1 highlight, in particular, that a Heckman selection model is the
only model that recovers unbiased estimates of the true effects of the state-level covariate, Z.
A Heckman selection model also performs best in terms of estimating the true value of the
model’s intercept, β0. Moreover, accounting for selection, the Heckman probit model also
recovers unbiased estimates for each parameter regardless of the value of ρ.
Our results demonstrate that ignoring underlying structural selection processes, and esti-
mating a single-equation model of the second-stage outcome, produces biased estimates and
possibly incorrect inferences. Moreover, common fixes, such as the inclusion of structural-
level variables or estimating random effects, do not correct for the underlying selection
problem. The results are significant for many analyses taking advantage of recent data
collection efforts which focus on disaggregated, group-level data, such as data on political
parties, protester movements, terrorism, and insurgencies. Moreover, the approach general-
izes beyond cases with binary outcome variables to other types of discrete outcome variables
(e.g., Greene 2010; Miranda and Rabe-Hesketh 2006).
Empirical Applications
To further demonstrate the impact of ignoring the process of structural selection, we replicate
prominent studies of domestic political instability. First, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) is
a widely cited work that argues that non-violent protests are more likely to result in govern-
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ment concessions than is the use of violence. Whether the protest resulted in government
concessions, however, is a second-stage outcome of a multi-stage process, in the first stage of
which structural conditions result in the formation of a protest campaign. The probability
of observing a violent or non-violent protest is thus conditional on the ex ante probability
of success and the structural conditions of the state. As we demonstrate above with Monte
Carlo estimates, the unmodeled non-randomness in protest data may lead to biased esti-
mates of covariate effects. It may be the case, for example, that nonviolent protests only
occur when conditions promoting change are more likely.
Second, we examine the effect of structural conditions on the lethality of terrorist attacks.
Asal and Rethemeyer (2008) show that the characteristics of terrorist organizations, specif-
ically the organizational size and ideology, affect the lethality of their attacks. We expect
that the presence of terrorist organizations is more likely in some states than others, and
that this process is non-random. Weaker states are less likely to prevent terrorist groups
from organizing, resulting in larger terrorist organizations, and weaker states may be less
able to prevent ideological radicalization. If a structural, state-level factor like state capac-
ity correlates with terrorist organizational characteristics, then estimates from group-level
terrorism data may be biased.
Our final replication examines whether the structural conditions in the state also affect
the strategies of conflict. Wood (2010) argues that rebel groups that lack the capacity
to garner popular support are also the groups most likely to target civilians during civil
conflicts. Of course, the observation of rebel groups is non-random and heavily conditioned
by the relative strength of the government and the likelihood of a rebel group’s success. The
non-random nature of the data, combined with the expected correlation between structural-
and group-level factors, suggests that selection processes may be at play.
Structure, Protest Occurrence, and Protest Outcomes
Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) look at how the methods utilized by protest cam-
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paigns affect how successful they are at obtaining their political goals. They expect
that non-violent protest campaigns are more effective than violent protest campaigns.
Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) treat the protest campaign as the unit of analysis, with data
that explores government–protest campaign interactions. However, game-theoretic mod-
els hypothesize that protest campaigns are (negatively) correlated with the expectation of
government repression (Pierskalla 2010; Ritter and Conrad 2016; Chyzh and Labzina 2018).
Further, since the use of repression differs systematically across states (Regan and Norton
2005; Davenport 2007; Hill and Jones 2014), we expect the likelihood of both protest and
success covary similarly. Complicating this relationship even more is the fact that protest
strategies covary with these same structural conditions. Almost by definition, non-violent
protest campaigns are impossible in extremely repressive regimes that do not tolerate dissent.
To account for the possibility of a non-random sample of protest movements, we examine
the probability of success by non-violent campaigns in achieving government concessions in
the context of sturctural selection. We model state-level data as a selection equation and
use those estimates to inform campaign-level data in the outcome equation.
We focus our replication on the main model (Model 1) of Table 3.1 from
Chenoweth and Stephan (2011). They measure a protest movement’s success as a binary
outcome coded 1 if it achieves its stated goals, 0 otherwise. Non-violent resistance is mea-
sured as 1 if the movement is primarily non-violent, 0 otherwise. They also control for level
of democracy, the number of participants in the movement, and the state’s population.6
We account for structural factors using the model of civil conflict from Fearon and Laitin
(2003, Table 1, Model 1).7 We employ data from Gibler and Miller (2014), who extend
and expand Fearon and Laitin’s dataset following the original authors’ coding rules. The
structural model includes common predictors of domestic strife, such as democracy, political
instability, GDP/capita, and whether a state has territory that is non-contiguous. The
model also estimates conditions that favor challenges to government authority, such as the
6See Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) for a discussion of how control variables are measured.
7See Regan and Norton (2005) for a similar structural/state-level approach to modeling protest behavior.
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size of the population, amount of mountainous terrain, oil exports, and ethnic and religious
fractionalization.8
Table 2 reports the results of our analyses using probit and Heckman probit selection
models, where the selection equation is the structural or macro-level and the outcome equa-
tion is the micro- or group-level event data.9 The first column displays the replication of
Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) Table 3.1, Model 1 using a probit model. The second column
displays the subset of the data for which the structural and campaign data overlap. This
ensures that the models in Columns 2 and 3 include the same set of observations to provide
a proper comparison. The third column displays the results when the multi-level selection
process is also modeled.
Comparing models demonstrates that structural factors appear to influence the likelihood
of whether protests occur. Once structural conditions are modeled, the type of protest
campaign does not exert a statistically significant influence in our model. The coefficient on
non-violent protests is roughly the same as its standard error. The coefficient for democracy,
however, is now statistically significant at conventional levels, as including estimates for the
structural factors influencing protests reduces the degree of uncertainty associated with the
coefficient. It is also worth noting that the constant is ten times larger in absolute value,
as well as positive and statistically significant, once selection based on structure is modeled.
This suggests that when protests are observed, regardless of other factors, they are more
likely to succeed.
Several factors associated with government weakness—population size, non-contiguous
territory, and political instability—increase the probability of observing protest movements,
while high levels of democracy are associated with fewer protests. The negative constant
implies the likelihood of protest at any given time is small and the negative rho suggests
that any unobserved factors decrease the likelihood of protest at any given time. Indeed,
8See Fearon and Laitin (2003) or Gibler and Miller (2014) for a discussion of how variables are measured.
9Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) Table 3.3 does consider potential endogeneity in the use of violent resis-
tance and protest-campaign success. However, they only look at the data from their protest campaign sample
when constructing their instrument. By doing so, they ignore endogenity induced by selection processes.
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Table 2: Probit Estimation of Protest Movement Outcomes and State Structure.
Variable Replication Subsample Structure-Selection
Protest Success
Non-violent 0.548∗ 0.463† 0.189
(0.290) (0.321) (0.168)
Democracy 0.031† 0.027† 0.022∗∗
(0.019) (0.020) (0.009)
Participants 0.229∗∗ 0.221∗∗ 0.118∗∗
(0.076) (0.084) (0.053)
Population -0.262∗∗ -0.295∗∗ -0.250∗∗
(0.104) (0.115) (0.071)
Constant -0.102 0.426 3.384∗∗
(0.952) (1.052) (0.537)
Domestic Protest
GDP/capita 0.016
(0.043)
Population 0.151∗∗
(0.021)
Mountains 0.007
(0.026)
Non-contiguous 0.249∗
(0.135)
Oil exporter -0.170†
(0.113)
Democracy -0.227∗∗
(0.070)
Democracy2 -0.112∗∗
(0.056)
Instability 0.308∗∗
(0.095)
Ethnic Frac 0.079
(0.145)
Religious Frac 0.060
(0.132)
Constant -3.813∗∗
(0.465)
Rho -0.930∗∗
(0.078)
Log-likelihood -79.88 -66.11 -616.36
Observations 141 115 7883 (115)
∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10 two-tailed, †p < 0.10 one-tailed. Robust stan-
dard errors in parentheses. The number under observations paren-
theses in the structure-selection model are uncensored cases.
protests are costly, and protesters often organize only after other alternatives are exhausted,
but this also suggests that mean likelihood of success among the observed protest campaigns
will be much higher than expected by chance. Each of these results is consistent with the
formal theoretical literature which expects that protesters behave strategically and are more
likely to protest (and use non-violent methods) when they expect that the government will
not repress.
The findings that non-violent protests are no more successful than violent protests and
that the set of observed protests arise from specific structural conditions also has important
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substantive implications. In the original analysis in Model 1, the predicted probability of
success of a non-violent protest campaign, holding all other variables at the mean or modal
values, is 53.8% with a 90% confidence interval of [41.1, 66.7]. The predicted probability
of a violent protest is 32.6% [22.5, 43.9]. The first difference between these values is 21.2%
[3.2, 39.5]. Once we account for the underlying structural selection processes, however,
the results change dramatically. The predicted probabilities of successful non-violent and
violent campaigns are now 69.7% [58.2, 86.7] and 63.4% [53.0, 78.8], respectively. The first
difference between these values is now only 6.4% [-3.0, 15.3], with the 90% confidence interval
now including zero.
Overall, the results suggest that there is a selection effect in the data and estimates based
solely on the group-level data will be biased. Moreover, the substantive results highlight
how analysts may draw incorrect or misleading inferences if they neglect to account for the
structural selection processes that make observing event data possible.
Structure, Terrorist Organizations, and Attack Lethality
Our second application examines the lethality of terrorist organizations.
Asal and Rethemeyer (2008) propose that, like other bureaucratic organizations, the
effectiveness of terrorist organization is a function, in part, of their organizational features.
Specifically, they expect that terrorist organizations are more effective when their attacks
are more lethal, and that this depends on factors such as the organization’s audience,
othering, and capabilities. “Audience” refers to whom the group is trying to impress,
“othering” refers to the out-group (moral or ethical), while capabilities are the material and
informational resources of the group (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008, 438-441).
We expect that each of these effects is, to some degree, moderated by the characteristics
of the state where the terrorist groups are located. States with weak governments, for
instance, are less likely to effectively employ their security forces to identify and prosecute
terrorist organizations; thus, terrorist groups in such states are likely to exist longer than
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those in stronger states. Ethnic or religious inequalities within states may lead to formation
of more violent terrorist organizations. Finally, states with few legitimate avenues to address
concerns are more likely to spur violent political opposition.
Asal and Rethemeyer (2008) estimate four negative binomial models in their analysis:
two models with al Qaeda included in the analysis and two without. For each type, they
included one model with the full dataset and one with only those data with which they have
high confidence in their measure of organizational strength. Their results are remarkably
consistent across the models. Our replication focuses on Asal and Rethemeyer (2008) Table
2, Model 3, which includes the full set of data for all terror organizations except for al Qaeda,
which as the perpetrator of the 9/11 attacks represents an extreme outlier in the data.
Asal and Rethemeyer (2008) treat the terrorist organization as the unit of analysis. They
measure lethality as a count of the fatalities attributed to a terrorist organization from 1998–
2005. They measure an organization’s ideology (religious, ethnonationalist, ethnonationalist
and religious, Leftist, and other), organizational features such as its age, size, connections to
other groups, whether it controls territory, whether it has a state sponsor, as well as whether
the host state is democratic and its degree of strength.10
Table 3 reports the results from a negative binomial model and a count model with
a selection stage (Miranda 2004; Miranda and Rabe-Hesketh 2006). In the latter model,
the selection stage contains state-level factors which affect the likelihood that a terrorist
group is present while the outcome equation contains the group-level terrorist organization
characteristics. The first column reports a replication of Asal and Rethemeyer (2008) Table
2, Model 311, while the second column accounts for the selection process.
There are several important differences between the two models. Notably, Leftist ide-
ology, while significant in both models, changes signs, from negative in the first model to
positive in the second. In addition, factors which failed to reach statistical significance in
10See Asal and Rethemeyer (2008) for a discussion of how variables are measured.
11Our replication does not match Asal and Rethemeyer (2008) Table 2, Model 3 exactly, owing to updates
to the dataset used by the authors Asal and Rethemeyer (2008, fn 10). Our results are, however, very similar
to theirs.
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Table 3: Count Estimate of Terrorist Organization Lethality and State Structure.
Variable Replication Structure-Selection
Attack Lethality
Size 1.367∗∗ 1.267∗∗
(0.209) (0.063)
Religious ideology 2.845∗∗ 1.985∗∗
(0.574) (0.150)
Ethnonationalist ideology 0.616 0.504∗∗
(0.498) (0.193)
Ethnonationalist & religious 3.257∗∗ 3.273∗∗
(0.519) (0.160)
Leftist ideology -1.094∗∗ 0.740∗∗
(0.313) (0.134)
Democracy 0.059∗∗ 0.079∗∗
(0.029) (0.008)
Organizational age 0.074∗∗ -0.025
(0.035) (0.038)
Organizational age2 -0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Count, organizational connections 0.244∗∗ 0.180∗∗
(0.081) (0.007)
Energy consumption/capita (state strength) -0.139∗∗ -0.001
(0.033) (0.012)
State sponsorship -0.924∗∗ -0.297∗∗
(0.359) (0.128)
Control of territory 0.779∗ 0.452∗∗
(0.422) (0.120)
Log exposure -0.254 -0.034
(0.392) (0.222)
Constant -0.299 -1.446∗∗
(0.596) (0.348)
Log(alpha) 1.671∗∗
(0.093)
Domestic Conflict
GDP/capita 0.083
(0.123)
Population 0.591∗∗
(0.071)
Mountains 0.246∗∗
(0.069)
Non-contiguous 0.472
(0.289)
Oil exporter 0.697∗
(0.366)
Democracy 0.071
(0.186)
Democracy2 0.000
(0.112)
Instability -2.176∗∗
(0.434)
Ethnic Frac 0.074
(0.449)
Religious Frac -1.924∗∗
(0.405)
Constant -5.387∗∗
(1.345)
Sigma 1.152∗∗
(0.057)
Rho -0.208∗∗
(0.071)
Log-likelihood -825.324 -1342.699
Observations 394 517 (394)
∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10 two-tailed, †p < 0.10 one-tailed. Robust stan-
dard errors in parentheses. The number under observations paren-
theses in the structure-selection model are uncensored cases.
the first model, such as ethnonationalist ideology and control of territory are statistically
significant once selection is accounted for. In contrast, organizational age and energy con-
sumption/capita are no longer statistically significant once structural selection processes
appropriately modeled. Finally, rho is positive and statistically significant, indicating that
unobservable factors between the two equations are positively correlated. That is, the unob-
servable factors that make terrorist organizations more likely to be present are also associated
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with making terrorist attacks more lethal.
The above results highlight that the location of terrorist organizations, and where they
attack, is in part a function of structural selection processes. While none of the above
results contradict the findings of Asal and Rethemeyer (2008), as audience, othering, and
capabilities are still demonstrated to matter, the impact of some of the specific elements
within these theoretical classifications do change.
Structure, Civil Conflict, and Civilian Targeting
Our final application explores the effect of structure-based selection on civilian targeting
by rebel forces. Wood (2010) argues that rebel groups with stronger capabilities vis-a`-vis
the government can use a mix of selective incentives and repression to garner support and
resources from the population. Weaker rebel groups, on the other hand, often lack the
capacity to offer incentives to the population to garner support and instead rely to a greater
degree on civilian targeting. The unit of analysis is the dyad-year, where the dyad consists
of an insurgent group and the government.
We previously argued that outbreaks of civil conflict are non-random, and data on rebel
groups can only be collected if civil conflicts are observed. These two points imply that ob-
served rebel groups are likely to be more capable than the population of potential rebel groups
(Nieman 2015; Chatagnier and Castelli 2016). Civil conflict, moreover, is made more likely
by specific strucural factors, e.g., low government capacity, institutional instability, lootable
resources (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Ross 2004; Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2009;
Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch 2011). Taken together, state factors affect the likeli-
hood of civil conflict, which in turn likely affects the type of rebel groups that are observed
and their interactions with the government. Thus, we expect that this structural selection
effect influences rebel group behaviors, including the tactic of civil targeting.
In our replication, we focus on Wood (2010) Table 2, Model 1. Wood (2010) measures the
count of rebel–civilian one-sided killings as the direct, intentional killings of civilians in non-
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combat situations by rebel forces (Eck and Hultman 2007).12 Rebel capability is the ratio
of troops to the scaled number of government troops (Eck and Hultman 2007).13 He also
controls for government violence against the population, identity conflicts, territorial conflict,
the overall degree of conflict severity, the age of the conflict, democracy, GDP/capita, and
whether the conflict takes place during the Cold War.14 We measure structural factors
related to conflict using the same model as above but also add a lagged variable of ongoing
conflict to account for conflict duration (Fearon and Laitin 2003).
Table 4 reports the results of analyses using a negative binomial model and a count
model that accounts for selection (Miranda 2004; Miranda and Rabe-Hesketh 2006). The
first column reports the exact replication of Wood (2010). The second column displays
the subset of the data for which the structural and rebel group data overlap; this is done
so that the models in Columns 2 and 3 include the same observations in order to ensure
proper comparison. The third column reports the results of a count model conditioned by
the structural selection process.
The estimates in Table 4 demonstrate that several structural factors influence the group-
level interactions that take place within them, such as GDP/capita and the degree to which a
state is democratic. The rho parameter in Column 2 is negative and statistically significant,
indicating that the unobservable factors from the structural-level are negatively correlated
with the unobservable group-level factors that affect one-sided rebel-civilian killing.15 Thus,
the same factors that lead an opposition to arm and to fight the government also make them
less likely to engage in one-sided civilian killing.
The structural factors also affect the substantive results in the dyadic analysis of rebel
tactics. The coefficient on rebel capability, for instance, is substantially smaller when con-
12The measure does not include indirect civilian deaths resulting from sieges, disease, collateral damage,
or extrajudicial executions (Wood 2010, 606).
13The scaling of the measure accounts for the potential presence of multiple insurgencies in one state.
14See Wood (2010) for a discussion of how the control variables are measured.
15The negative correlation of the structural- and group-level errors is consistent with Gibler (2017), who
found that structural conditions affect reporting of crisis events in narratives compiled by the International
Conflict Group.
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Table 4: Count Estimate of Rebel One-sided Civilian Killing and State Structure.
Variable Replication Subsample Structure-Selection
Rebel Civilian Killing
Rebel capacity -0.492∗∗ -0.403∗∗ -0.075∗∗
(0.178) (0.147) (0.035)
Government violence 0.000∗ 0.000∗ 0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Identity conflict 0.892∗∗ 0.891∗∗ -0.756∗∗
(0.427) (0.293) (0.115)
Territorial conflict -1.008∗∗ -1.169∗∗ -0.565∗∗
(0.413) (0.329) (0.080)
Conflict severity 0.601∗∗ 0.536∗∗ 0.521∗∗
(0.087) (0.064) (0.022)
Age 0.224† 0.172 -0.510∗∗
(0.172) (0.160) (0.030)
Democracy 0.107∗∗ 0.104∗∗ 0.031∗∗
(0.037) (0.030) (0.008)
GDP/capita -0.718∗∗ -0.608∗∗ -0.131∗∗
(0.229) (0.185) (0.036)
Cold War -0.807∗∗ -0.624† -0.963∗∗
(0.380) (0.405) (0.079)
Constant 4.796∗∗ 4.494∗∗ 3.011∗∗
(1.725) (1.453) (0.337)
Log(alpha) 2.677∗∗ 2.625∗∗
(0.140) (0.083)
Civil Conflict
GDP/capita -0.142∗∗
(0.054)
Population 0.026
(0.029)
Mountains 0.080∗∗
(0.033)
Non-contiguous -0.258†
(0.175)
Oil exporter 0.153
(0.149)
Democracy -0.616∗∗
(0.149)
Democracy2 -0.587∗∗
(0.139)
Instability 0.175†
(0.132)
Ethnic Frac 0.374∗
(0.220)
Religious Frac -0.421∗∗
(0.196)
Ongoing Conflict 2.340∗∗
(0.101)
Constant -1.129∗
(0.593)
Sigma 1.117∗∗
(0.036)
Rho -0.305∗∗
(0.037)
Log-likelihood -1830.262 -1703.220 -6190.310
Observations 679 609 3293(609)
∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10 two-tailed, †p < 0.10 one-tailed. Robust stan-
dard errors in parentheses. The number under observations paren-
theses in the structure-selection model are uncensored cases.
ditioned by structural selection. To better demonstrate this change, Figure 2 compares the
substantive effects of the two models using predicted values (90% confidence intervals) from
Monte Carlo simulations based on estimates from Table 4. The solid line displays predicted
values using Model 1 and the dashed line displays predicted values accounting for structural
selection. The model that ignores selection identifies a steep, declining slope in civilian ca-
sualties as rebel capabilities increase, while the model that accounts for structural selection
factors shows almost no decline in civilian casualties at all. Moving from a rebel capacity of
0.2 to 0.8 in the replication without selection, for example, results in a decrease of civilian
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Figure 2: Substantive Effects of Changing Rebel Capacity on Civilian Targeting.
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Note: The solid line displays predicted values and 90% confidence intervals using the replication
of Wood (2010) reported in Table 4, Model 2. The dashedline displays predicted values and 90%
confidence intervals after accounting for structural selection, based on the estimates from Table 4,
Model 3.
casualties of 84.8 to 69.2. Comparatively, moving from a rebel capability of 0.2 to 0.8 in the
model where structural selection is account for results in a change in civilian casualties from
20.2 to 19.3. Substantively, this means that ignoring structure-level factors would lead one
to significantly overestimate the degree to which rebel capacity reduces civilian killings by
insurgent groups.
Finally, it is also worth noting that the sign on the coefficient for identity conflict changes
from negative to positive, and is statistically significant in both models. Similarly, while
age is positive and significant at the 0.1-level, one-tailed test in Model 1 and positive but
statistically insignificant in Model 2, once structural selection processes are accounted for,
the coefficient is negative and statistically significant. Ignoring structural selection may lead
one to incorrectly infer that identity conflicts are more likely to result in civilian targeting
than non-identity conflicts, and that older rebel groups are more likely to target civilians
than younger ones.
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Our empirical applications demonstrate that some inferences from recent work on protest
movements, terrorism, and civilian targeting during civil conflicts are likely to be incorrect.
Non-violent protests are not more effective once the structural environment that influences
the likelihood of protest is considered. The lethality of a terrorist organization does appear
to depend, to some degree, on the organization’s ideology, but which ideologies are identified
as more deadly appears to be influenced by the structural environment that the terrorists are
in. Those same environmental factors also heavily influence the observation of rebel groups
and their degree of civilian targeting. As we argue, accounting for structural selection issues
improves estimates and associated inferences of causal variables and relationships which, in
turn, enhances our theoretical understanding and increases the quality of policy prescriptions
based on these theories.
Conclusion
We argue that structural selection impacts estimates involving disaggregated events data.
We use both a Monte Carlo experiment and empirical replications to demonstrate that model
estimates are improved by accounting for the the non-random processes at the structural-level
that makes such groups organize in the first place. Our empirical applications demonstrate
that some inferences from recent work on protest movements, the lethality of terrorist groups,
and civilian targeting during civil conflicts are likely to be incorrect. Non-violent protests are
not more effective once the structural environment that influences the likelihood of protest
is considered. Those same environmental factors also influence the observation of terrorist
organizations and rebel groups in their capacity for killing civilians.
Finally, though we focus this paper on domestic outcomes, we believe that structural
characteristics are also inherent within other types of event data. Green political parties, for
example, tend to form under specific types of political and economic conditions. Likewise,
international militarized disputes tend to occur in certain regions and certain times. Ac-
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counting for structural selection helps improve estimates and associated inferences, which,
in turn, enriches our theoretical understanding of political processes and enhances the quality
of our policy prescriptions.
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